Using a sample of French crop farms during the 1999-2007 period, we test whether farmers' technical efficiency under conventional practices is a significant driver of conversion to organic farming. An important issue is whether subsidies to organic farming could encourage inefficient farmers to convert. We find that the probability of conversion does depend on technical efficiency preceding the conversion, but that the direction of the effect depends on farm size. This result is found to be robust to the method of calculation of efficiency scores, either parametric or non-parametric. This study also confirms that farm's characteristics (education, farm size, indebtedness) and farmers' practices under conventional farming do impact the probability of conversion to OF.
Introduction
A number of food-safety events along with increasing concerns for sustainability of ecosystems make organic farming (OF) an appealing option for both governments and consumers. As a consequence, most governments, particularly in the United States (US) as well as in the European Union (EU), have encouraged farmers to convert to OF by distributing conversion subsidies. In the EU the first national subsidization programs started in a few countries like Denmark and Austria at the end of the 1980s, while the EU-wide recognition arrived with the Council Regulation 2092/91 and the inclusion of support to OF in agri-environmental measures (Stolze and Lampkin 2009) . The rationale behind subsidies to OF is that farmers internalize negative externalities on the environment, without being paid for it on the market.
Although there exist claims that agricultural subsidies in general have rather favored conventional systems to the detriment of organic systems (e.g. Nemes 2009 ), the provision of specific support to OF may be the main motivation to adopt the organic technology (OT) for some farmers. In her literature review Padel (2001) noted for example that the adoption of OT had been higher in those European countries where the support program for OF was more favorable. If conversion to OF has historically been based on ideological motives and other non-economic factors, a shift to financial motivation has been observed since the late 1990s when payments for OF started to be introduced (Rigby et al. 2001; Darnhofer et al. 2005; McCarthy et al. 2007 ). Farmers adopting OT based on economic aspects are identified in the literature as "pragmatic", in opposition to "committed" converters. The possibility of OF specific subsidy programs attracting "subsidy-hunters" has been discussed by Pietola and Oude Lansink (2001) and Tzouvelekas et al. (2001) , but seldom tested.
If the objective of the policy is to support agricultural activity and farmers' income, then attracting "subsidy hunters" into OF may not be a problem per se. However, if the policy is aimed at maximizing organic production at the least possible cost, then it may be worth checking who is attracted by the subsidy program. Indeed, if "subsidy-hunters" make their production choices based on the maximization of subsidies received, they are likely to be less efficient than farmers who search for the best combination of outputs and inputs based on prices and available technology. In this particular situation, the subsidy program could induce some adverse selection effect that may not be considered desirable by the policy makers.
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate whether less efficient farmers are more likely to convert. This test has been made only once, as far as we know: Kumbhakar et al. (2009) , on a sample of Finnish farms, estimate simultaneously technical efficiency (TE) and organic adoption. They do not find any evidence of an adverse selection effect since, on their sample, inefficiency did not increase the probability of conversion to OF. In this article we test the adverse selection hypothesis on a sample of French crop farms by assessing the impact of past TE on the decision to convert to OF. By contrast to Kumbhakar et al. (2009) who perform a joint estimation, we employ a two-stage approach. We estimate the influence of several determinants, including TE calculated in a first stage, on the probability to convert to OF. In order to draw robust conclusions, TE scores are calculated using both parametric methods (stochastic frontier) and non-parametric methods (bias-corrected Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), and Free Disposal Hull (FDH)). In addition we take into account that French farmers operate in very different agro-climatic conditions when calculating the TE scores. The data used cover several years, enabling us to investigate the influence of several farm characteristics, including TE, in past periods, on the decision to adopt OF.
There exist a number of articles comparing TE of organic producers and conventional producers. Such comparisons are an indication of how close to the production frontier each group of farmers operates. But because organic and conventional production technologies are different in most cases (Mayen et al. 2010) , such a comparison cannot be used as evidence for or against the adverse selection hypothesis. We argue that such evidence can only be obtained by estimating simultaneously production choices and decision to convert to OF (Kumbhakar increase to 20% in 2020 . Some crucial policy steps are necessary to attain this objective, since at the end of 2008 only 2.1% of the national utilized agricultural area (UAA) were under OF.
Understanding the determinants of conversion to OF and in particular the effect of past performance (as measured by technical efficiency) will provide valuable information for designing successful policy programs.
Section 2 explains the modeling framework. In Section 3, we describe the data and discuss our hypotheses regarding the role of the main variables of interest on OF adoption. In Section 4, we present the methodology for calculating TE scores and estimating the probability of conversion to OF. The results are commented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Modeling framework
For comparability purposes, we focus our analysis on crop farming and disregard livestock farming, for which requirements for converting to OF are more complex. We assume that a representative crop farmer (currently using conventional practices) takes the decision to adopt organic technology (OT) or to continue with the conventional technology (CT) based on the comparison of his/her expected profit under the two technologies during the next five years.
In France this duration corresponds to the period during which the farmer receives subsidies for conversion after the conversion occurred (Ministère de l'Agriculture 2001). Since the conversion to OF is not an irreversible decision, the farmer may decide, at the end of the fiveyear period, to switch back to conventional farming. For the period under consideration, there was no support scheme for organic farmers in France after the conversion period had ended.
For simplicity, we assume that the farmer owns one unit of land, and that all this land is converted to OF in case of adoption of this technology. In addition, we assume that converting to OT does not alter the crop pattern on the farm. We also assume that the farmer is riskneutral and we neglect the discount factor. A farmer will adopt OT in year t if and only if ( ) ( In general, we expect the price of organic products to be higher than the price of conventional products once the production has been organically certified. In our modeling framework, input prices are assumed to be the same ( ) .
Finally, under the assumptions of unchanged crop pattern on the farm and similar agricultural policy over the period considered, subsidies received by the farm are higher under OT due to the specific subsidies received by the farmer during the period of conversion ( )
On an economic point of view, subsidies are justified by organic farmers' private internalization of social costs caused to the society from environmental pressures. On a practical point of view, subsidies may be seen as compensatory payments for the loss in revenues due to technical difficulties implying lower yields during the conversion period, and to the impossibility for the farmer to sell at the organic price during the first years of the conversion period. In France the level of conversion subsidies set by the government is calculated on the basis of the potential profit loss depending on the type of crop, and is provided per hectare of specific crop converted. For example cereals would be eligible to 366 euros per hectare in the first two years following conversion, 183 euro/ha in the following two years, and 122 euro/ha in the fifth year (Ministère de l'Agriculture 2001).
The decision of each farmer to convert to OF will thus depend, among other things, on production technology, organic price premium, costs differentials, conversion subsidies and farmer's characteristics including technical efficiency. Since all these factors may differ across crops and geographical areas, the decision to convert to OF remains an empirical question.
Description of the data and variables used in the analysis

Database
We use farm-specific data extracted from the French Farm Accountancy Data Network 
Factors hypothesized to influence OF adoption
Farmer's characteristics
It is commonly acknowledged that non-economic factors such as political and ideological perspectives, sensitivity to environmental problems, health and food quality considerations may induce a farmer to convert to OF. For example, in a survey of 550 organic farmers made in Sweden in 1990, 79% responded that the primary reason for converting was non-economic (i.e., enjoyment, environment, health, food quality, or previous experience) instead of being related to reduce grain surplus, market adjustment, better economy or support provided (Lohr and Salomonsson, 2000) . Also Läpple (2010) finds that Irish drystock farmers who expressed a higher level of environmental concern were more likely to adopt OT in 2008. Similarly, Genius et al. (2006) indicate that in 1996-1997 Cretan farmers who expressed great concern about environmental problems were more likely to convert to OF. The same finding is reported by Burton et al. (2003) for horticultural farmers surveyed in 1996 in the United Kingdom. Our data do not contain any variable on farmer's opinion about issues related to environment, health and food quality. We introduce in our model a variable measuring the share of agri-environmental subsidies in total operating subsidies received by the farmer, as a proxy for his/her environmental awareness and environmental practices. We hypothesize that a farmer getting more agri-environmental subsidies under conventional farming is more likely to convert to OF.
We also control for the farmer's level of education. In a review of factors influencing the adoption of conservation agriculture practices (including, but not restrained to, OT), Knowler and Bradshaw (2007) find that "education, be it specific or general, commonly correlates positively with the adoption of conservation agriculture practices; however, some analyses have found education to be an insignificant factor or even to negatively correlate with adoption". For example, Genius et al. (2006) find that the number of years of education increased the probability to convert to OT by Cretan farmers in 1996 -1997 . Gardebroek (2003 also indicates a positive effect of education on the conversion probability for Dutch dairy farms in 1994-1999. Similarly, Koesling et al. (2008) , for a survey of Norwegian farms in 2003, find a positive effect of education on the probability that a surveyed conventional farmer has indicated to potentially convert to OF in the future. Since better educated persons are often more sensitive to environmental problems but also because of the assumed positive link between education and knowledge regarding new technologies, we hypothesize better educated farmers to be more likely to adopt OT.
Farm's structural characteristics
We expect the size of the farm at the time it was operated under conventional practices to influence the decision to convert to OF. Pietola and Oude Lansink (2001) , for a sample of Finnish farms, find that farmers with large land areas and, consequently, good opportunities for practicing extensive farming technologies, are more likely to switch to OF. This reason is also proposed by Gardebroek (2003) to explain the positive effect of farm UAA on the probability to convert for Dutch dairy farms during 1994-1999. By contrast, Läpple (2010) finds that farm UAA has a negative effect on farmers' decision to adopt OT for a sample of is expected to be lower for smaller farms, which should then have a higher probability to adopt OT. For the particular case of France, we thus hypothesize that larger farms (as measured by the farm UAA) are less likely to adopt OT.
Policies
Even if the theory indicates that the higher the subsidies to OF, the greater the probability of adoption should be, there is little empirical evidence on the magnitude of the effect. Pietola and Oude Lansink (2001) find that the probability of switching to OF increases at an increasing rate with increasing premium subsidies to the OF for Finnish farms during 1994-1997. They estimate that a 1% increase in the premium subsidy rate for OF increases the probability of choosing OT by 0.2%. Interestingly, the elasticity of the probability of conversion to the non-organic specific subsidy rate for land is the same. This latter result may suggest that the subsidy to support conversion may be seen by some farmers as a way to increase their revenues, at least during the period of conversion. Hence policies promoting OF may suffer from selection problems because subsidies may attract into OF less productive conventional farmers who are more "pragmatic" than "committed". Tzouvelekas et al. (2001) , in a study of the olive-growing sector in Greece, make a similar analysis. They assess that a "loose" eligibility criterion for receiving the conversion subsidy has attracted "subsidyhunters" not truly interested in producing organically but rather in absorbing the "organic" financial aid. Kumbhakar et al. (2009) , for a sample of Finnish dairy farms (followed during the period from 1995 to 2002), also find evidence that higher subsidies increase the probability of OT adoption. Lohr and Salomonsson (2000) report that 147 out of 234 Swedish organic producers who converted in 1990 following the introduction of the conversion subsidy scheme in the country in 1989, would not have converted in the absence of subsidies. Tzouramani et al. (2010) , using a real option approach on a sample of dairy sheep farms in Greece, explain that organic farming is not a profitable option in the absence of organic subsidies even if farms can benefit from investment subsidies to adopt the new technology. In what follows, we will calculate the organic subsidy level that each farmer would get over the next five years if converting to OF in the next year. This calculation is based on the assumption that the whole area is converted to OF and that the crop pattern on the farm does not change after conversion. 4 We then use in the model the average conversion subsidy per ha of UAA per year. We hypothesize that a higher potential conversion subsidy per ha will increase the probability to convert to OF.
We will also introduce in the model the total amount of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) subsidies received by the farm (as a ratio of its total output), and expect a positive effect as public subsidies may reduce the farm's financial pressure. This effect was hypothesized and given evidence by Genius et al. (2006) , who find that subsidies received in the context of the CAP by Cretan farmers in 1996-1997 increase their probability to convert to OF. The effect of non-organic subsidies on the probability to adopt the OT may also reflect the attitude of the farmer towards subsidies. However, this effect may be ambiguous. On the one hand, "subsidy-hunters" may be interested in both non-organic and organic subsidies, implying a positive effect. On the other hand, farmers receiving a large amount of CAP subsidies may find it sufficient and may not be interested in getting additional subsidies.
Potential change in input costs
Farmers who make an intensive use of fertilizers and plant protection products under conventional practices may experience a larger reduction in input costs after adoption of OT, and may thus be more likely to adopt. However, a non-intensive use of fertilizers and plant protection products before adoption could also indicate farmers' environmental awareness and thus a higher probability to adopt OT. Also, conventional farmers who use a relatively low level of fertilizers and plant protection products are more likely to use a technology which is in fact similar to the OT, and may thus be more likely to adopt OT. The effect of the intensity of fertilizers' and plant protection products' use before conversion is therefore ambiguous but we expect the latter effect to dominate, that is to say low input use under conventional farming should increase the probability to convert to OF. McBride and Greene (2009) calculate farming cost under OT and CT for a sample of soybean producers in the US in 2006.
The authors find that costs per bushel are on average USD 1 to USD 6 higher under OT than under CT. In particular, while chemical costs are lower under OT, capital and labor costs are much higher. Oelofse et al. (2010) report that total variable costs were higher for a sample of Chinese organic soybean producers compared to their conventional counterparts. The differential was USD 116 per ha, which is mainly due to a differential of USD 177 per ha in hired labor cost in disfavor of organic producers. Not using data from a sample of farms but with a case-study of one farm in England, Cobb et al. (1999) find that switching to OF induces higher labor costs and higher fixed costs (on this particular farm the conversion to organic agriculture required different machinery). Comparing one organic dairy farm with a conventional one with equivalent structure in , Shadbolt et al. (2009 indicate that the organic holding incurred higher fixed cost but lower cost per cow (veterinary, feed). In the forthcoming empirical application, we will use the ratio of fertilizer expenditure over the standard gross margin as a measure of intensity of fertilizer use, but we do not have a priori expectations on the sign of the effect.
Potential change in revenues
In France, a farmer converting to OF will usually experience a decrease in revenue, at least during the first years of conversion. We expect that farmers for whom the expected decrease in revenue after conversion from CT to OT is lower to be more likely to adopt OT. This is confirmed for example by the study by Gardebroek (2003) for Dutch dairy farms in 1994-1999, who finds that past year profit has a negative effect on the choice of adopting OT.
Farms with higher past profit may indeed incur higher decrease in revenue if they converted to OT. It may also be the case that a positive shock on profit may encourage to continue with the current technology whereas a negative shock may encourage switching. The revenue differential depends on both yield and price differentials between OT and CT. In regions where yield has been historically high we expect a lower probability of conversion.
The price differential between OT and CT has also an impact on expected revenues, as motivated in the modeling section. Official statistics regarding the price of organic products do not exist in France. We therefore make use of the information available in our FADN sample to compute a price index for organic products and build a variable that measures the price premium that farmers could get if they were switching to OF. This calculation is made under the assumption that the cropping pattern remains unchanged on the converting farm and that the entire crop area is converted. 5 We are not aware of any study using such a variable to explain adoption. Pietola and Oude Lansink (2001) find that a 1% output price decrease increases the probability of choosing OT by 0.4%, but output price in their model is the same for both organic and conventional products. In our analysis we expect farmers with a higher expected price premium to have a higher probability to adopt OT.
Technical efficiency
As mentioned earlier, there exists a number of studies comparing the TE of organic producers and conventional producers but few try to assess the influence of TE before adoption on the decision to convert to OF. Some studies suggest that organic farmers are more technically efficient compared to conventional farmers: e.g. Tzouvelekas et al. (2001) Lansink (2005), in an unpublished paper, find that organic dairy farms are less technically efficient than conventional farms in Finland, using stochastic frontier distance functions.
Strictly speaking, the difference between average technical efficiencies between organic and conventional farmers cannot be interpreted to suggest that one group is more efficient than the other one since production frontiers are different for organic and conventional holdings.
Differences in efficiency simply indicate that farms belonging to the group with the higher average TE operate closer to their production frontier than farms from the other group do to theirs. In a recent article Mayen et al. (2010) , using formal testing, reject the hypothesis that organic and conventional farms employ a single, homogeneous technology using data on US dairy farms. They also find that organic dairy technology is 13% less productive than that used by conventional farms and find little difference in TE across the two groups.
To our knowledge, the only study which considers TE as a potential factor driving adoption of OT is Kumbhakar et al. (2009) . They propose a joint estimation where TE drives both technology choice and output. Based on a sample of Finnish dairy farms (over the period [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] , their results suggest that inefficiency is not a driving force behind adoption of OT as the inefficiency score has a negative effect on the probability of adoption. The level of TE achieved under CT may have an ambiguous effect on the decision to adopt OT. On the one hand, farmers who are already technically efficient under CT, that is to say who have rationalized their use of inputs, may adopt more easily a technology that is complex and that uses low levels of inputs. On the other hand, conversion implies a decrease in yields, and this may reduce incentives to convert for technically efficient farmers who obtain high yields under CT. The ambiguity is reinforced by the allocation of conversion subsidies. Indeed, conversion subsidies may compensate for the loss in revenue during the conversion period, and thus may reduce the negative influence of TE on the decision to convert to OF; it may in turn motivate highly efficient farmers to convert. However, if there is no obligation or no financial incentives to remain under OT after the conversion period, as it was the case in France during the period studied here, then this may attract low efficient farmers in the organic sector, who may revert to CT once the compulsory conversion period has ended.
In the forthcoming empirical application, in order to test for the effect of TE under CT on the decision to convert to OF, we consider four-year average of TE calculated before adoption for future OF adopters. By contrast to Kumbhakar et al. (2009) who use data from the same period to estimate TE and the probability to convert, we use data from the period before conversion to OT. Moreover, we use an average over several years in order to smooth for climate shocks that may affect TE levels.
Risk
OF is generally perceived to be riskier than conventional farming, as organic farmers are restricted in the use of chemical pesticides and fertilizers that could help them in reducing production risk (Gardebroek et al., 2010) . Organic farmers are therefore more exposed to disease or parasite outbursts, and to harsh weather conditions. Also, as it is the case with any new technology, a farmer willing to adopt OT has to face uncertainty regarding expected revenues and costs since it may take some time for him/her to learn about this new technology. Sipiläinen and Oude Lansink (2005) , using data on Finnish dairy farms, estimate the length of the conversion and learning process of OF to be on average 6-7 years. Gardebroek et al. (2010) estimate the Just-Pope stochastic production function using panel data of Dutch organic and conventional specialized arable farms covering the period 1990-1999. They find evidence that manure and other fertilizers are risk-increasing inputs on organic farms but risk-decreasing inputs on conventional farms. Capital and land are found to reduce production risk while labor and other variable inputs are found to increase it in both farm types.
Using data from a sample of Spanish farms specialized in the production of arable crops, Serra et al. (2008) find evidence that both conventional and organic farmers are risk averse.
Both groups are found to exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) but organic farmers have preferences that are very close to constant absolute and relative risk aversion (CARA and CRRA). The authors explain that these differences may come from the fact that organic farmers in the sample considered are wealthier than conventional growers (and may thus be willing to take more risk). Gardebroek (2006) attitudinal statements, decreases the probability to adopt OT. Similarly, Kallas et al. (2010) find that Spanish grape producers surveyed in 2008 who took risky management decisions, were more likely to convert to OF.
The measurement of risk aversion goes beyond the scope of this article. However, we will consider explanatory variables that may be linked to unobserved risk aversion. We include a categorical variable to control for the legal status of the farm which distinguishes between farms managed through a sole proprietorship, farms under partnership management, and companies. In the latter, private assets are separated from professional assets and therefore we would expect farms run as companies to be less risk averse than individual farms. We will also control for the ratio of farm debt to assets and hypothesize that farms with a higher share of debt will be less likely to convert to OF due to their current financial vulnerability.
Social learning / neighborhood effects
As far as we know, the role of social learning and neighborhood effects on the adoption of OT has not been extensively studied yet. It is recognized that information provided about new technologies (by other farmers, media, meetings, farmers' unions, extension officers, etc)
usually positively correlates with adoption of these technologies (Knowler and Bradshaw 2007) . Moreover, observing successful organic farmers could give incentives to conventional farmers to convert (Lohr and Salomonsson 2000) . Lohr and Salomonsson (2000) find for example that, for a sample of Swedish farmers in 1990, the number of organic farms in a farmer's district increases his/her probability to convert. Thus we should expect CT farmers neighboring OT farmers to learn more quickly about the technology and to have a higher probability to adopt OT. Unfortunately we do not have any information on the total number of farms engaged in OF in the neighborhood of the farms surveyed in our sample. with an average UAA of 142 ha and 111 ha respectively. These farms receive the highest amount of operational subsidies, on average, and are the least labor-intensive farms. A summary description of all variables that will be used as explanatory factors in the OF adoption model is available in Appendix A1 and some descriptive statistics of these variables are presented in Appendix A2. The summary statistics indicate that farmers who convert to OT have (on average) lower TE scores (how TE scores are calculated is explained below), operate a smaller farm, are more educated, receive a higher share of agro-environmental subsidies, and are less indebted than farmers who continue to operate under CT.
Descriptive statistics of the data
Methodology
A two-stage approach
We proceed in two steps. In the first step, we calculate the TE scores of all farms present in the FADN sample between 1999 and 2007. We use three competing methods to obtain TE scores and take into account that farmers operate in different agro-climatic conditions. In the second step, we estimate the probability of a farm converting to OF in a specific year as a function of a set of farm and farmer characteristics before conversion, including the farmer's average TE score computed over the four years preceding the conversion. The second-stage estimation is made on a selected sample of farms: those farms that are present at least one year during the 2003-2007 period and for which the TE score could be calculated over the four years preceding conversion. Since our sample is a rotating sample, we are not able to control for entry and exit of farms over time. We believe that this shortcoming of the dataset will not induce selection bias in the second-stage estimation.
We chose to calculate the average TE score over the four years preceding the conversion in order to get a "robust" measure of TE for each farmer. Indeed, farmers may exhibit lower TE scores when facing adverse weather conditions. A four-year average allows smoothing such effects and avoid peaks or drops in TE that would be only artifacts of specific years. Going further than four years would have entailed the loss of too many observations at the secondstage of the analysis. Further details on the methodology are provided in the following.
First stage: calculation of TE
In the literature two main approaches compete to calculate TE: parametric methods, in particular stochastic frontier (SF), and non-parametric methods, in particular DEA and FDH.
The SF approach relies on estimating a production function with a double error term, including a random error term and a term representing farmers' technical inefficiency (see Aigner et al. 1977; Meeusen and van den Broeck 1977) . This method enables to account for noise, but may give rise to misspecification errors. By contrast, DEA is a deterministic method but does not rely on specification assumptions (see Farrell 1957; Charnes et al. 1978) .
The idea behind DEA is to construct, with linear programming, a piece-wise frontier that envelops all observations of the sample used. The distance of an observation to the frontier represents its technical inefficiency, with observations on the frontier being fully technically efficient and with a TE score of 1. FDH relies on the same idea, except that the convexity assumption of the frontier is relaxed, and thus the frontier is step-wise and envelops the observations more closely than DEA does (see Tulkens 1993 ).
Non-parametric methods are sensitive to outliers as they construct the frontier with observations at hand. For this reason, in addition to cleaning manually inconsistent data, outliers were removed before efficiency computations with DEA and FDH, based on Wilson's (1993) outlier detection method that relies on comparing geometric volumes spanned by subsets of data. Moreover, efficiency results from the DEA method may be affected by sampling variation. This problem, inherent to the method, implies that distance from the frontier (and thus inefficiency) may be underestimated if the most performing units of the population are not included in the sample at hand. To correct for this problem, bootstrapping followed by bias-correction or confidence interval construction is the only method available (Simar and Wilson 2000a) . Here the smooth homogenous bootstrap proposed by Wilson (1998, 2000b ) is used to provide bias-corrected technical efficiency scores for DEA.
In order to draw robust conclusions, the three approaches, namely SF, DEA and FDH, are used here. In each case the model includes one single output, namely total output in value, and four inputs, namely UAA (ha), total labor used in Annual Working Units (AWU; 1 AWU corresponds to one full-time equivalent that is to say 2,200 hours of labor per year), intermediate consumption in value, and the value of assets. The Cobb-Douglas function is specified for the SF approach. 6 An input-oriented model is assumed for DEA and FDH. The assumption of variable returns to scale (VRS) is made for the DEA model.
Farmers' TE may be affected by agro-climatic conditions, and the efficiency scores calculated may not reflect only farmers' management practices but may also incorporate some inefficiency component due to unfavorable natural conditions if the latter are not controlled for in the efficiency model. In our case, this may in turn affect the influence of TE on the probability to convert. For this reason, TE frontiers are constructed separately for groups of farms, depending on their agro-climatic conditions. Farms are firstly classified into two or three groups within each TF with a hierarchical agglomerative clustering procedure based on annual municipality data relating to slope, altitude, average monthly minimal and maximal temperatures, average monthly water deficits and average monthly climatic indices (calculated with sunshine, frost durations and evapotranspiration). 7 Then TE is calculated with separate frontiers for each cluster in each TF and in each year of the period.
Second stage: estimation of the determinants of the conversion to OF
Following (1), we assume that farmer i decides to convert to OF in period t if the expected net benefit of this decision is positive, that is if
The latent variable, , is not observed; only the decision to adopt OT or not is known to the econometrician. We assume that farm i's expected net benefit from converting to OF can be modeled as follows:
, where the vector X it includes characteristics of the farmer and its environment. The decision model at time t is thus written as
And the probability that farmer i adopts OT in year t is estimated using the following Probit model: Our purpose is to model the decision to convert to OF. In the data used farmers who do adopt OT take the decision to convert to OF only once. Therefore, in our adoption model, a farm that converts to OF is included in the sample only once, in the year that the conversion is made, and excluded from the sample in the subsequent years (Khanna and Damon 1999 followed a similar approach). For consistency, and to avoid the presence of repeated observations over time, a random draw is designed such that non-adopters also appear only once in the final sample. Since it is likely that the decision to adopt OT is made (at least) a year before the actual conversion, and in order to eliminate simultaneity bias, all explanatory variables are measured in year t-1, except for the TE proxy that is measured as the average of TE scores calculated in years t-4, t-3, t-2 and t-1, with t being the year of conversion for farmers who convert and being the year of observation for farmers who remain in conventional farming.
Three regression models will be estimated, differing in the TE score used as an explanatory variable: one regression including the average (over the four years preceding conversion of the converting farm or preceding observation of the conventional farm) TE score calculated with DEA under VRS and corrected for sampling bias; one regression including the average TE score calculated with FDH; one regression including the average TE score estimated with SF. (under the assumption that the variances in the two sub-samples are unequal). We indicate in Table 3 when the null assumption that the two means are equal is rejected.
Results
Technical efficiency
The average TE scores by TF vary depending on the computation method. For all TFs, the average TE score obtained using FDH is higher than the TE score calculated from the SF, itself being higher than the TE score obtained with DEA under VRS assumption. b (*), (**), (***) respectively indicates that the null assumption that the two means are equal is rejected at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance.
The mean comparison tests indicate that farmers growing field crops (TF13, 14, and 60) and who will convert to OT have higher average TE scores than farmers who will keep operating with CT (except for TF14 with SF). The difference in average TE scores is statistically significant for SF-based TE scores in TF13 and TF60, and for FDH-based TE scores in TF14.
For farmers engaged in wine and grapes production (TF37 and TF38), the average TE scores
for farmers who will convert to OT are lower than the average TE scores for farmers who will remain with CT. The difference between average TE scores is statistically significant for DEA-based and FDH-based TE scores in TF37 and for SF-based TE scores in TF38. Finally, for farmers growing fruits and vegetables (TF28) or engaged in horticulture (TF29), there is no clear pattern and no statistically significant difference between TE scores of the two groups of farmers.
Determinants of the conversion to OF
We present below the estimation results of the three Probit regression models, which differ only by the method of calculation of the TE scores (DEA-based, FDH-based, and SF-based) used as an explanatory variable. The three models are estimated on a sample of 3,761 farmers, including 43 OT adopters. The number of farms adopting OT is quite small in our sample (see Table 1 ), which makes it necessary to estimate a unique adoption model with all TFs merged.
A number of models were estimated differing on the explanatory variables' combination, and we kept the one which provided the best fit to our data. In this model, the TE score has been interacted with the size of the farm (UAA). Results of the Probit estimations are presented in Table 4 (robust standard errors were calculated). The four-year average TE score is found to have a significant impact on the probability of conversion directly as well as indirectly through its cross effects with farm size (TE × UAA), whatever the method used to calculate the TE score. In all three models, the direct effect of the TE score on the probability of conversion is negative and statistically significant while the cross term with farm size has a negative effect. Hence, the effect of past performance on the probability of conversion to OF depends on farm size.
In our sample, the elasticity of the probability of conversion with respect to the TE score is found to be negative for low values of farm size and positive for high values of farm size. The turning point is calculated at 109 ha in the model using DEA-based TE scores, 101 ha in the model using FDH-based TE scores, and 61 ha in the model using SF-based TE scores. For the sample used for estimating the model, the average farm size is 87 ha, hence the elasticity of the probability of conversion to the four-year average TE score is negative for some farms and positive for others.
Because our sample gathers farms engaged in different production specializations (TF), it is important to check whether our main result, that the elasticity of the probability of conversion depends on farm size, holds for the entire group of farmers as a whole or if it could be driven by heterogeneous effects across different TFs. The number of adopters in each TF is too small to permit separate Probit estimations by TF. However, it is possible to interact TF dummies with the four-year average TE score and/or to add TF dummies in the model. We re-estimated the three Probit models under these different specifications. In any case do the TF dummies come out significantly. This indicates that our findings hold for all farmers in our sample whatever their TF. The main conclusion would thus be that "low-efficient" farmers operating a farm which size is below a certain threshold (61 ha to 109 ha depending on the model) are more likely to convert to OF while "high-efficient" farmers operating a farm which size is above this threshold are more likely to convert to OF.
In our sample though, the average size of farms growing field crops is higher than the threshold (in TF13 and TF14 the average farm size is 142 ha and 115 ha respectively, and the average farm size is 82 ha in TF60) while the average farm size for farms growing grapes, fruits, vegetables or flowers is lower than the threshold. Our findings thus may indicate that a higher past performance induces a higher probability of conversion to OF in field crops but a lower probability of conversion to OF in other TFs.
In order to assess the magnitude of the effect of TE on the probability of conversion to OF, we calculate, for each type of farming activity, the expected probability of conversion if all farmers were technically efficient (Table 5 ). In the second and third columns of Table 5 , we report the current (observed) probability of conversion and the current number of organic farmers. We then show, for each of the three models (models with DEA-based, FDH-based, and SF-based TE scores) the predicted probability of conversion and the corresponding predicted number of organic farmers. These predicted probabilities have been calculated at the sample mean for each type of farming activity, and under the assumption that the average TE score is 1 (fully technically efficient farmers). All three models predict an increase in the number of organic farmers producing COP (TF13).
In the model using SF-based TE scores, the number of organic farmers more than doubles, while the magnitude of the effect is smaller in the other models. The number of organic farmers is found to decrease or remain constant in the other types of farming. This is because the elasticity of the probability of conversion is negative at the mean of the corresponding samples. All in all, if all farmers in our sample were technically efficient, the number of organic adopters would be lower. Depending on the model, it would vary from 22 to 38, which corresponds to a decrease in the number of adopters in the range of 12% to 50%.
The three models also provide consistent findings on the positive role of education (EDUC):
better educated farmers are found to be more likely to convert to OF than less educated farmers. More educated farmers may be more sensitive to environmental and food safety issues, they may also learn more quickly about new technologies, than less educated farmers.
In the three models, smaller farms (when size is measured by UAA) are found to be more likely to adopt OT all other things equal, which may be explained by smaller farms generating lower yields under CT than larger farms (and thus expecting a lower yield loss if converting to OF). These two findings confirm our expectations.
In the three Probit regression models, we obtain the expected result that farmers receiving more agri-environmental subsidies (as a percentage of total subsidies) (SH_ENVSUBS) are more likely to convert to OF. Also, farmers who incur higher fertilizers expenditure (relatively to their standard gross margin) (FERT_SGM) are less likely to convert to OF (this variable is however not significant in any of the three models). The coefficients for the potential difference in prices (organic versus non-organic products) (POTDIFPRICE) and the potential conversion subsidies (POTCONVSUBS) that could be received annually if converting next year are positive as expected, but not significant. The variables representing risk, namely legal status (STATUS) and indebtedness (DEBTTOASSET) are not significant in any of the models, as well as the proxy for subsidy dependence (SUBTOOUT).
Robustness checks
Because the proportion of adopters is very small in the full sample, we re-estimated the three Probit models on a choice-based sample (see Greene 2003) , that is a sample in which the proportion of adopters is made artificially higher (the non-adopters are randomly selected).
Our choice-based sample contains 238 observations, among them 43 adopters and 195 nonadopters, hence the proportion of adopters has been increased to 18% compared to our original sample. In order to correct the bias induced by over-sampling one group of farms, we estimate the model using the weighted endogenous sampling maximum likelihood (WESML) estimator derived by Manski and Lerman (1977) . The log-likelihood function is written as follows:
where describes the adoption decision ( The results obtained for the choice-based sample are found to be very close to the ones obtained for the full sample. However some of the explanatory variables have become significant in the models based on the choice-based sample, in particular the ratio of debt to asset (DEBTTOASSET) and the potential difference in prices between organic and conventional products that may be received by converting farmers (POTDIFPRICE). The ratio of debt to asset has the expected negative sign in the three models and is found significant in the models using the DEA-and FDH-based TE scores. This confirms that farms already indebted are less likely to take any risk in converting to OF. This result may also indicate that the farming assets are to some extent technology specific. Farmers who have recently invested (in technology specific assets) would incur higher switching costs and are, therefore, more reluctant to switch. A higher expected difference in prices between organic and conventional product is found to significantly increase the probability of adoption in the three models, which also confirms our intuition.
The TE scores were calculated based on separate frontiers for each TF, each year, and each cluster (defined from agro-climatic conditions). These TE scores were then pooled together in Table 4 . The relative TE score for farmer i is defined as the percentage of farms that have a lower TE score than farmer's i own TE score (in the group of farms that are used to define the frontier). We call these variables TE ranks. The three Probit models are then re-estimated on the full sample using TE ranks instead of TE scores. Estimation results are shown in Table 6 . Table 6 indicates that the three models provide results that are similar to the ones obtained using TE scores and presented in Table 4 . The elasticity of the probability of conversion with respect to the TE score is still a function of farm size, with a negative value for small sizes and a positive value for large sizes. The turning point in the three models is as follows: 148 ha in the model using DEA-based TE ranks, 110 ha in the model using FDH-based TE ranks, and
Conclusion
Using a sample of French crop farms over the 1999-2007 period, we test whether technical efficiency attained under conventional practices is a driver for conversion to OF. Despite some limitations in our data, we find that the probability of conversion does depend on technical efficiency preceding conversion but that the direction of the effect depends on farm size. More efficient farmers have a lower probability to convert if they operate small farms while they have a higher probability to convert if they operate large farms. The threshold that defines the sign of the elasticity of the probability of conversion to the average TE score has been estimated between 61 ha and 109 ha depending on the model. In our sample, the average size of farms engaged in field crops is higher than the threshold, while the average size of farms engaged in grape, fruits, vegetables or flower production is lower than the threshold.
This finding is found to be robust to the method of calculation and definition of TE scores, either parametric (SF) or non-parametric (bias-corrected DEA or FDH). This study also confirms that farmer's and farm's characteristics (education, farm size, indebtedness) and farmers' practices under the CT (as measured by the share of agri-environmental subsidies in total subsidies and expenditure in fertilizers) do impact the probability of conversion to OF.
The low number of OT adopters in our sample and the impossibility to analyze partial conversions were the main limitations of our analysis. With a higher number of observations, we could have tested for heterogeneous responses across different types of farming or geographical areas.
Our results thus indicate that there may be an (adverse) selection effect, that is less efficient farmers being attracted by OF, in particular among the group of "small" farms in France. This is not a surprising finding given that small farms may suffer from financial problems due to their size (diseconomies of scale, difficulties to sell their small output to downward industries, credit constraints) which force them to consider production alternatives. One of them is OF, which enables small farms to produce high-value commodities, to obtain higher prices, to sell in short circuits, and thus to increase their profit. Hence, small inefficient farms are more likely to consider conversion to OF. However, with our results we cannot ascertain that such farms adopt OT in the main objective of receiving additional subsidies, nor that the selection effect is prompted by the subsidy program. Our findings would have to be confirmed with more recent data for two reasons. onwards. While on a competition point of view such regulation was welcome by French farmers who felt that they could not compete with imports of organic products from countries with less strict production rules, on a technical point of view the regulation largely lowers the national requirements that were in place in France. Hence, French farmers willing to convert to OF may find it easier now that the requirements are less tight, which may induce the conversion of less efficient farmers. Investigating the role of TE and organic payments on farmers' decision to convert is therefore necessary on more recent data.
On a policy point of view, such issue is crucial. Indeed, public authorities in industrialized countries have always been interested in the drivers of structural change and in whether the agricultural sector's competitiveness is constrained by the survival of inefficient farms. In general it is recognized that public support programs to agriculture enable inefficient farms to remain in the sector by covering their losses. However, inefficient farms may provide services to the society other than the production of food and fiber. The protection of environment is one of such services, whose provision is supposed to be realized by organic farms. In addition, higher labor employment on organic farms than on conventional farms may contribute to the socio-economic health of rural areas, in particular the remote ones. 
